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Abstract
Oblivious transfer (OT) is a protocol where a receiver can obtain t-out-of-n
services from the sender without releasing anything about his choices. OT
can be used to protect user’s privacy. In principle, any user can interact with
a server to request some services. This might allow some undesirable users
to obtain services from the server. How to ensure that only the authorized
receivers can obtain services obliviously is a daunting task. In this paper, we
introduce oblivious signature based-on envelope (OSBE) to OT and propose
two novel OT schemes, which only allow the legitimate receivers to obtain
services obliviously. The receiver is required to authenticate himself to the
issuer to possess the required credential prior to access the protected services; while no authentication from the sender needs to be done. The sender
knows the number of the services selected by the receiver, but does not know
anything about his choices and personally identiﬁable information. The feature of our scheme also lies in avoiding zero knowledge proofs and achieving
all-or-nothing non-transferable credentials. Our schemes are eﬃcient in the
cost of communication and computation.
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1. Introduction
Although the Internet has brought enormous beneﬁts to people, security
and privacy problems have been a major concern to the users. Internet users
are concerned with their privacy, and require their personally identiﬁable
information (PII) not to be collected, pilfered and illegally used. Although
users believe that a small part of PII is insuﬃcient for identifying the real
identity, the malicious attackers can aggregate the collected partial PII, such
as health condition, ﬁnancial data and hobbies, to analyze and trace the
real user. Lessons from identity theft, identity fraud, ﬁctitious identity etc.
suggest that PII should be released under the user’s control in the critical
moment.
Obviously, there is a trade-oﬀ between the accountability and privacy.
How to balance them is a challenging problem. There have been some attempts toward a solution, such as identity management 1,2 , user-centric system 3,4,5 , privacy-preserving systems 6,7 , anonymous credential 8,9,10,11,12,13,14 ,
hidden credentials 15 , k-time anonymous authentication 16,17,18,19 . These systems addressed the security of the user’s PII so that the user cannot be
impersonated. In practice, the adversary can trace and identify a user not
only by the PII, but also by his activities, such as the websites he visited frequently, the goods he purchased online. Therefore, in order to protect users’
privacy, we need a new system that captures the security of both PII and
services selected by a user. The following properties should be considered:
1. Only the authorized users can access the protected services.
2. The service providers should not know anything about the user’s PII.
3. The service providers should not know anything about the contents of
the services the user selected.
Suppose there exists a third trusted party (TTP) called the issuer, who is
trusted by all participants in the system. Prior to accessing the services,
the user needs to authenticate himself to the issuer and obtain the required
credentials. The user can use these credentials to access the protected services, without revealing any information about his choice and PII to the
service providers. Such a system can be used in some practical scenarios.
For example, in the library database system, the user registers himself to the
manager and then obtains a permission to access the database system. The
database will record the number of the items he accessed, without knowing
anything about the contents of the selected items. The library can charge
2

the user according to the number recorded by the database. Both the PII
and the selected services are not disseminated to the database. Therefore,
this system can resist against a malicious database that analyzes the user
from the partial PII and services. Other applications of this system can be
found in the sensitive information system, where only the qualiﬁed people
can access the protected services, such as patent search, DNA databases and
multi-party computations.
Proposed by Rabin in 1981 20 , and extended by Brassaard, Crépeau and
Robert in 1987 21 , k-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OTnk ) is a cryptographic
primitive, where the sender and the receiver have messages M1 , M2 , · · · , Mn
and choices σ1 , σ2 , · · · , σt ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, respectively. After a transfer, the
receiver obtains messages Mσ1 , Mσ2 , · · · , Mσt , while the sender can not know
anything about the receiver’s choices. Adaptive k-out-of-n oblivious transfer
(OTnk×1 ), proposed by Naor and Pinkas 22,23 , allows the receiver to obtain
services from the sender one by one adaptively, namely the i-th choice may
depend on the ﬁrst i − 1 choices. Therefore, adaptive k-out-of-n oblivious
transfer can provide stronger security than k-out-of-n oblivious transfer.
A drawback of OTnk×1 is that there is no limitation on the user; namely
any one can interact with and receive services from the server obliviously.
There exist some attempts to prevent an illegal receiver from accessing the
protected services. Aiello, Ishai, and Reingold proposed a priced oblivious
transfer based on homographic encryption and private information retrieval
(PIR) 24 , where only if the price of the selected service is less than the remaining balance, then the receiver can obtain the service from the sender
obliviously. Otherwise, the selected service will be denied. Subseqently,
Crescenzo, Ostrovsky and Rajagopalan 25 proposed a conditional oblivious
transfer scheme where the receiver can access the protected service if and
only if his secret key satisﬁes the public predicate. Unfortunately, the privacy of users was not considered in these schemes.
Recently, Coull, Green and Hohenberger proposed an oblivious transfer
with access control using state graphs 26 . In this scheme, the receiver’s state
shifts from one to another after each transition. If all states are used, the receiver cannot access the protected services any longer. Camenisch, Dubovitskaya and Neven proposed another oblivious transfer with access control 27,28 ,
which is more eﬃcient than the former. All these schemes work as follows:
1. The receiver authenticates himself to the issuer, and obtains the required credentials from him.
3

2. The receiver proves that he has possessed the required credentials to
the sender in zero knowledge.
3. The receiver and the sender execute an oblivious transfer 29 to obtain
the intended services.
In these schemes, the user needs to authenticate himself to the issuer and
obtain credentials. Then, the receiver proves that he is an authorized receiver
to the sender in zero knowledge. Since the receiver needs to authenticate
himself two times, the cost of computation and communication is expensive.
Recently, Camenisch, Dubovitskaya, Neven and Zaverucha proposed a new
oblivious transfer with access control scheme where a user can only knows
whether he is granted to access the service items and dose not know anything
about the access control policies 30 .
Proposed by Li, Du and Boneh 31 , oblivious signature-based envelope
(OSBE) is a cryptographic primitive, where the receiver can obtain the secret
encapsulated in the envelop by the sender if and only if he has possessed a
signature from the issuer on the public message. Additionally, the receiver is
not required to authenticate himself to the sender. The sender cannot distinguish the receivers who have possessed credentials from the receivers who has
not possessed credentials. Therefore, the signature is a hidden credential 151 .
OSBE has been used in automated trust negotiation (ATN) 34 , secure function evaluation (SFE), secret handshakes 35 . Notably, the sender in OSBE
cannot control the interaction. The reason is that the sender encrypts the
secret only under the parameters obtained from the issuer, instead of using
his own private key.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose two novel eﬃcient oblivious transfer schemes with
access control. In our schemes, only the authorized user (receiver) can obtain services from the server obliviously. The server knows how many items
the authorized user can obtain but it knows nothing about the contents of
the selected items. Additionally, the receiver is not required to authenticate
himself to the server. Therefore, the user releases nothing about his PII to
the server. Our schemes do not require any zero knowledge proof, and hence,
our scheme is more eﬃcient than other schemes. We propose the extended
chosen-target computational Diﬃe-Hellman (XCT-CDH) assumption, which
1

This notion was proposed by Holt, Bradshaw, Seamons, and Orman in 2003, and has
been used to protect users’ privacy 32,33
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extends the chosen-target computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CT-CDH) assumption, and prove that these two assumptions are equivalent.
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, preliminaries
required throughout this paper are described. In Section 3, two eﬃcient
oblivious transfer with access control schemes are proposed and proven. The
complexity of the proposed schemes is analyzed. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we review the deﬁnition and security model of oblivious
transfer with access control and introduce the related assumptions. Based
on the chosen-target computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CT-CDH) assumption,
we propose the extended CT-CDH (XCT-CDH) assumption, and prove that
they are equivalent.
R
Unless noted otherwise, in the rest of this paper, by ω ← Ω, we denote
R
that ω is chosen at random from Ω. Especially, if Ω is a ﬁnite set, ω ← Ω
Υ
Υ
denotes that ω is chosen uniformly from Ω. By R → S and R ← S, we
denote that party R sends Υ to party S, and party S sends Υ to party
R, respectively. By y ← A(x), we denote that y is obtained by running
algorithm A on input x. We say that a function  : Z → R is a negligible
function, if for all c ∈ Z there exists a n ∈ Z such that |(x)| < x1c for all
x > n. By k, we denote a security parameter. We denote KG(1k ) as a key
generator which takes as input k and outputs a secret-public key pair.
2.1. Deﬁnition and Security Model
There are three entities in an oblivious transfer with access control (OTAC)
scheme: issuer I, sender S and receiver R. The issuer authenticates the receivers, and issues credentials to them. The senders send the selected services
to the receivers. The receivers interact with the issuer and senders to obtain
the required credentials and intended services. There are four algorithms in
an oblivious transfer with access control scheme:
• Setup. Taking as input the security parameter k, this algorithm responds with the system public parameters P P . The issuer generates
his secret-public key pair (isk, ipk) ← KG(1k ). The sender generates
his secret-public key pair (ssk, spk) ← KG(1k ).
5

• Issue. Taking as input the secret key isk, the sender’s identiﬁer si and
the receiver’s identiﬁer ri, it returns a credential to the receiver.
• Commit. Taking as input the secret key ssk and n messages M1 , M2 , · · · ,
Mn , this algorithm returns n ciphertext C1 , C2 , · · · , Cn .
• Transfer. Taking as input the intended indexes σ1 , σ2 , · · · , σt and the
secret key ssk, respectively, the receiver and the sender interact. At
the end, the receiver obtains the services Mσ1 , Mσ2 , · · · , Mσt , while the
sender knows nothing about the receiver’s choice.
Correctness: An OTAC scheme is correct if the receiver can obtain his intended messages when the sender and the receiver follow the steps of the
scheme.
Security Model. Since the seminal introduction of oblivious transfer, there
have been many literatures that discuss its security. The security model
of oblivious transfer can be classiﬁed into the following types: Honest-but
curious model, half-simulation 36 and full-simulation 29,37 .
Proposed by Naro and Pinkas 36 in 2005, the half-simulation is a model
where the issues of protecting the receiver and the sender are separated.
The security of the receiver requires that two transcripts which the receiver
used to obtain services Sσ and Sσ are indistinguishable from the view of the
sender. The security of the sender is deﬁned by comparing the real world and
the ideal world experiments. In the real world experiment, the receiver and
the sender run the protocol. Meanwhile, in the ideal world experiment, the
protocol is implemented by a trusted third party Charlie. For any malicious
receiver A in the real world experiment, there exists a malicious receiver A
that plays the role of A in the ideal world experiment such that the outputs
of A and A are indistinguishable.
We deﬁne that an oblivious transfer with access control scheme is secure,
if the following properties can be satisﬁed:
Privacy of the Receiver.
1. The receiver releases nothing about his PII to the sender.
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2. For any two diﬀerent choice sets C = {σ1 , σ2 , · · · , σt } and C  = {σ1 , σ2 ,
· · · , σt }, the transcripts received by the sender corresponding to M =
{Mσ1 , Mσ2 , · · · , Mσt } and M = {Mσ1 , Mσ2 , · · · , Mσt } are indistinguishable. Especially, the choices of the receiver are unconditionally secure,
if the received services {Mσ1 , Mσ2 , · · · , Mσt } and {Mσ1 , Mσ2 , · · · , Mσt }
are identically distributed.
Security of the Sender. Suppose that the receiver has possessed the required
credentials from the issuer. To deﬁne the security of the sender, we compare
the real world and the ideal world paradigms. In the real world, the receiver
and the sender execute the protocol. Meanwhile, in the ideal world, the
functionality is replaced by a trusted third party (TTP). The sender sends all
his messages {M1 , M2 , · · · , Mn } to the TTP. The receiver sends his choices
{σ1 , σ2 , · · · , σt } adaptively to the TTP. If {σ1 , σ2 , · · · , σt } ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , n},
the TTP sends {Mσ1 , Mσ2 , · · · , Mσt } to the receiver. An oblivious transfer
with access control can protect the security of the sender, if for any receiver
R in real world, there exists an probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) receiver
R in the ideal world such that the outputs of R and R are indistinguishable.
Semantic Security. If the receiver has not obtained the required credentials
from the issuer, he can obtain nothing about the protected services.
2.2. Security Assumptions
Let G1 , G2 and Gτ be multiplicative cyclic groups with prime order p,
namely |G1 | = |G2 | = |Gτ | = p. Let g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2 be the generators
of G1 and G2 , respectively. A bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → Gτ satisﬁes the
following properties:
1. Bilinearity. for all θ ∈ G1 , ϑ ∈ G2 and α, β ∈ Zp , e(θα , ϑβ ) = e(θ, ϑ)αβ .
2. No-degeneracy. e(g1 , g2 ) = 1, where 1 is the identity in Gτ .
3. Computability. There exists an eﬃcient algorithm to compute e(θ, ϑ),
for all θ ∈ G1 , ϑ ∈ G2 .
Let GG(1k ) be a bilinear group generator that takes as input k and output
the description of groups (G1 , G2 , Gτ ) with prim order p and a bilinear map
e : G1 × G2 → Gτ . Let G(1k ) be a group generator which takes as input k
and output the description of group G with prime order p
7

Deﬁnition 1. -Strong Diﬃe-Hellman ( -SDH) Assumption 38 . Let (G1 , G2 , Gτ )
← GG(1k ) be a bilinear group. Let g1 and g2 be the generators of G1 and G2 ,
respectively. We say that -SDH assumption holds in (G1 , G2 , Gτ ), given
2

+ 2-tuple (g1 , g2 , g2x , g2x , · · · , g2x ), if for all probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary A
1

2



−SDH
(k) = P r[(γ, g1x+γ ← A(g1 , g2 , g2x , g2x , · · · , g2x ))] ≤ (k)
AdvA

where the probability is over the random choice of x ∈ Z∗p and the random
bits consumed by A.
Deﬁnition 2. Chosen-target Computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CT-CDH) Assumption 39 . Let g be a generator of group G ← G(1k ) with prime order p and
R
x ← Zp . Let H : {0, 1}∗ → G be a cryptographic hash function. There are
two oracles TG (·) and HG (·). TG (·) is called the target oracle, which takes
as input j ∈ Zp , and responds with gj ∈ G. HG (·) is called the help oracle,
which takes as input gj ∈ G, and returns gjx ∈ G. Let QT and QH denote the
numbers that the two oracles are queried, respectively. CT-CDH assumption
holds in G, if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A


((ψ1 , i1 ), · · · , (ψπ+1 , iπ+1 )) ←
CT −CDH k
≤ (k)
(1 ) = Pr
AdvA
ATG (·),HG (·) (g, g x, H, p)
where ψl = gixl , for l = 1, 2, · · · , π + 1, and QH < π + 1 ≤ QT .
Intuitively, CT-CDH assumption demonstrates that the adversary can
query the help oracle on at most π elements in G, and get back with these
elements to the power x. If the orders of these π elements on the generator
of G are unknown, the adversary can not compute a new element in G to
the power of x, which orders on the generator and the π queried elements
are unknown. Based on CT-CDH assumption, we propose the extended CTCDH (XCT-CDH) assumption. We replace the target oracle in CT-CDH
assumption with π + 1 random elements of G. We will proof that the XCTCD assumption and the CT-CDH assumption are equivalent.
Deﬁnition 3. EXtended Chosen-target Computational Diﬃe-Hellman (XCTCDH) Assumption. Let g be a generator of the group G ← G(1k ) with prime
R
order p, and x ← Zp . There is a help oracle HG (·), which takes as input
gj ∈ G, returns gjx ∈ G. Given (π + 1)-tuple {g a1 , g a2 , · · · , g aπ+1 }, where
8

R

al ← Z∗p for l = 1, 2, · · · , π + 1, XCT-CDH assumption holds in G, if for all
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A
XCT −CDH
AdvA
(K) = P r[g xaiπ+1 ← AHG (·) (p, g, g x, g ai1 , g ai2 , · · · , g aiπ )] ≤ (k)

where ail ∈ {a1 , a2 , · · · , aπ+1 }, for l = 1, 2, · · · , π + 1.
Theorem 1. Chosen-target computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CT-CDH) assumption and extended chosen-target computational Diﬃe-Hellman (XCT-CDH)
assumption are equivalent.
Proof. Given {g a1 , g a2 , · · · , g aπ+1 }, we deﬁne H : l → g ail ∈ G, where
ail ∈ {a1 , a2 , · · · , aπ+1 }, for l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , π + 1}; otherwise H : l → g bl ,
R
where bl ← Zp . So, H(·) is a cryptographic hash function.
On the one hand, if the adversary A can break the CT-CDH assumption, we will show that there exists an algorithm B, who can uses A to
break the XCT-CDH assumption. Given {g a1 , g a2 , · · · , g aπ+1 }, for QT (QT ≤
a
π + 1) target oracle queries, the challenger returns g ai1 , g ai2 , · · · , g iQT , where
aij ∈ {a1 , a2 , · · · , aπ+1 }, for j = 1, 2, · · · , QT . For QH (QH ≤ π) help oracle
queries, the challenger queries the help oracle HG (·) in the XCT-CDH asxa
sumption, and returns g xai1 , g xai2 , · · · , g iQH , where ait ∈ {a1 , a2 , · · · , aπ+1 },
for t = 1, 2, · · · , QH . If A can compute ψπ+1 = gixπ+1 , B can compute
g xaiπ+1 = gixπ+1 , where H(π + 1) = giπ+1 = g aiπ+1 . So, B can break XCTCDH assumption.
On the other hand, if A can break the XCT-CDH assumption, we will
show that there exists an algorithm B, who can use A to break the CTCDH assumption. When A queries help oracle on {g ai1 , g ai2 , · · · , g aiπ }, the
challenger queries the help oracle HG (·) in CT-CDH assumption, and gets
back with {g xai1 , g xai2 , · · · , g xaiπ }, where π = QH . If A can outputs g xaiπ+1 ,
B can compute ψπ+1 = gixπ+1 , where H(π + 1) = giπ+1 = g aiπ+1 and π + 1 =
QH + 1 > QH . So, B can break the CT-CDH assumption.
Therefore, the chosen-target computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CT-CDH)
assumption and the extended chosen-target computational Diﬃe-Hellman
(XCT-CDH) assumption are equivalent.
Note that the extended chosen-target computational Diﬃe-Hellman (XCTCDH) assumption is computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH) assumption, if the
help oracle HG (·) in XCT-CDH assumption is canceled.
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Indistinguishability. We deﬁne that two distribution families Ω1 (k) and Ω2 (k)
are (statistically) indistinguishable, if

|P rx∈Ω1(k) [x = y] − P rx∈Ω2(k) [x = y]| ≤ (k)
y

3. Oblivious Transfer with Access Control
In this section, two eﬃcient oblivious transfer with access control schemes
are proposed. The ﬁrst one is very simple, while the credentials of the receiver
are transferable. Comparatively, the second one sacriﬁces a little eﬃciency,
while the credentials of the receiver are all-or-nothing nontransferable, which
means that all credentials are shared, if the receiver share one with others 8 .
Overview. Our idea is as follows: at ﬁrst, the receiver interacts with the
issuer to obtain a credential, which is a signature on a public message, for
example the identiﬁer of the sender in the trusted circle 2 . Then, the sender
commits his services using OSBE under the public message and his private
key. Finally, the receiver interacts with the sender, decrypts the ciphertexts
using the possessed credential, and obtains the intended services. In our
schemes, only the qualiﬁed receivers can obtain services from the sender
obliviously, while are not required to authenticate (proof) himself to the
sender in zero knowledge. Additionally, nothing about the protected services
can be released to the illegal receiver, who has not obtained the required
credentials from the issuer.
3.1. Oblivious Transfer with Access Control-I
Based on the short signature 38 and the oblivious transfer 40 , we proposed
an oblivious transfer with access control scheme AC-OTnk×1 -I, where only the
receiver who has possessed the required credential can get services from the
sender adaptively, without releasing anything about his PII and the contents
of the selected service to the sender. The sender knows how many services
the receiver can obtain if he has possessed a credential, but knows nothing
about the credential of the receiver. AC-OTnk×1 -I is described in Fig. 1.
Theorem 2. AC-OTnk×1-I is correct.
2

Trusted circle is a domain where all participants trust the issuer.
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Setup. Taking as input a security parameter λ, this algorithm outputs a bilinear group (e, G1 , G2 , Gτ ) ← GG(1λ ) with prime order q, where e : G1 × G2 →
Gτ . Let g and h be the generators of G1 and G2 , respectively. The issuer
R
I generates his private-public key pair (x, y) ← KG(1λ ), where x ← Z∗q and
y = hx . The sender S generates his private-public key pair (z, Z) ← KG(1λ ),
R
R
where z ← Z∗q and Z = e(g, h)z . The issuer selects r ← Z∗q , and sends r to the
sender a , where z ≡ x + r (mod q) and r + x ≡ 0, 1 (mod q).
1

Issue. The issuer computes σ = g x+r , and sends (σ, r) to the the receiver R.
?
R checks e(σ, yhr ) = e(g, h).
Suppose that S has messages M1 , M2 , · · · , Mn ∈ Gτ .
R

Commitment Phase. S chooses t1 , t2 , · · · , tn ← Z∗q , and computes T = yhr and
Ci = (Ci,1 , Ci,2), where Ci,1 = T ti and Ci,2 = e(g, h)zti · Mi , for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
S sends {(C1 , C2 , · · · , Cn )}ni=1 to R.
Transfer Phase.
R

1. R chooses sj ← Z∗q , and computes
s

Aij = e(σ, Cij ,1 ) = e(g, h)tij , Bij = Aijj
where ij ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}.
Bij

2. R −−→ S.
Dij

3. R ←−− S. S computes Dij = (Bij )z , and sends Dij to R.
s−1

4. R computes Eij = Dijj and Mij =
a

Cij ,2
Eij

.

r is the identiﬁer of the sender in the trusted circle.

Figure 1: Oblivious Transfer with Access Control-I (AC-OTnk×1 -I)
Proof. If the receiver R holds a credential (σ, r), he can compute
Aij = e(σ, Cij ,1 )
1

= e(g x+r , (yhr )tij )
1

= e(g x+r , hx+r )tij
= e(g, h)tij ,
11

and
e(g, h)ztij · Mij
Cij ,2
=
s−1
Eij
Dijj
=

e(g, h)ztij · Mij
zs−1

Bij j

e(g, h)ztij · Mij
=
Azij
=

e(g, h)ztij · Mij

e(g, h)ztij
= Mij .

Theorem 3. AC-OTnk×1-I is unconditionally receiver-secure.
Proof. For any Bij received by the sender from the receiver, there exists
s
an sw ∈ Zq (w = j) such that Bij = Aijj = e(g, h)sj tij = e(g, h)sw tiw = Asiww =
sj ti

Biw , namely sw = ti j mod q.
w
So, from the view of the sender, Bij is computed from Cij ,1 or Ciw ,1 is
identically distributed. AC-OTnk×1 -I is unconditionally receiver-secure.
Theorem 4. AC-OTnk×1-I is sender-secure, if the the XCT-CDH assumption
holds in Gτ .
Proof. For any probabilistic polynomial-time malicious receiver R̂ in the
real model, we can construct an probabilistic polynomial-time malicious receiver R̂∗ in the ideal model such that the outputs of R̂ and R̂∗ are indistinguishable.
1. S sends M1 , M2 , · · · , Mn to the trusted third party Charlie.
R

2. R̂∗ sends C1∗ , C2∗ , · · · , Cn∗ to Charlie, where Ci∗ = (Ci∗1 , Ci∗2 ) ← G2τ , for
i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
3. R̂∗ monitors the outputs of R̂. If R̂ can compute Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Aik and
Bi1 , Bi2 , · · · , Bik , R̂∗ chooses A∗i1 , A∗i2 , · · · , A∗ik and Bi∗1 , Bi∗2 , · · · , Bi∗k ,
R

where A∗iv , Bi∗v ← Gτ , for v = 1, 2, · · · , k.
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4. When R̂ takes as input Bi1 , Bi2 , · · · , Bik to obtain Di1 , Di2 , · · · , Dik ,
R̂∗ queries the help oracle HGτ (·) on Bi∗1 , Bi∗2 , · · · , Bi∗k , and gets back
∗
with Di∗1 , Di∗2 , · · · , Di∗k , where Di∗w = Bizj , for w = 1, 2, · · · , k.
5. If R̂ can compute Eij = e(g, h)ztij , R̂∗ sends ij to Charlie. Charlie
returns

Ci∗ ,2
j

Mij

.

6. R̂∗ outputs (A∗i1 , A∗i2 , · · · , A∗ik , Bi∗1 , Bi∗2 , · · · , Bi∗k , Di∗1 , Di∗2 , · · · , Di∗k , C1∗ ,
C2∗ , · · · , Cn∗ ).
If R̂ obtains k + 1 messages, R̂∗ does not know which k indices are really
selected by R̂. The simulation fails. Otherwise, we will show that R̂ can get
at most k messages under the XCT-CDH assumption. If R̂ can get k + 1
messages, he can compute Eij , for j = 1, 2, · · · , k + 1. Namely, after receiving (e(g, h)ti1 )z , (e(g, h)ti2 )z , · · · , (e(g, h)tik )z , R̂ can compute (e(g, h)tik+1 )z .
This contradicts to the XCT-CDH assumption. So, R̂ can obtain at most k
messages from the sender.
{Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Aik } and {Bi1 , Bi2 , · · · , Bik } are random elements in Gτ .
C1 , C2 , · · · , Cn are random elements in G2 × Gτ . {Di1 , Di2 , · · · , Dik } and
{Di∗1 , Di∗2 , · · · , Di∗k } are identically distributed. Therefore, the outputs of R̂
and R̂∗ are indistinguishable.
Theorem 5. AC-OTnk×1-I is semantically secure under the -SDH assumption and XCT-CDH assumption.
Proof. There are two types adversaries:
Type-I: The adversary can compute Ai = e(g, h)ti , then he can act as
the authorized receiver to interact with the sender.
Type-II: The adversary can compute the decryption key e(g, h)zti from
Ci .
We will show that Type-I adversary can be used to break the -SDH
assumption or XCT-CDH assumption and Type-II adversary can be used to
break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Type-I: Suppose that A is Type-I adversary.
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1. If A can compute the signature (σ, r), then compute Ai , Bi , and Ei ,
there exists an algorithm B can use A to break the -SDH assumption 3 .
2. If A can not compute σ, he can compute Ai from Ci,1 = (yhr )ti .
If it is, there exists an algorithm B who can use A to break the
XCT-CDH assumption as follows: Given e(g, Ci,1) = (e(g, h)x+r )ti
and e(g, h), the aim of B is to compute e(g, h)ti . B sends Ci,1 to
A, if A can compute e(g, h)ti , B aborts. B can use A to break the
XCT-CDH assumption.
Type-II: Suppose that A is Type-II adversary. If A can compute e(g, h)zti
from Ci,1 , there exists an algorithm B can uses A to break the XCTCDH assumption as follows: Given (e(g, h)x+r )ti , and e(g, h)z , the aim
of B is to compute (e(g, h)z )ti . B sends Ci = (Ci,1, Ci,2 ) to A. If A can
C
compute Mi , B aborts. B can compute e(g, h)zti = Mi,2i . So B can use
A to break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Therefore, AC-OTnk×1 -I is semantically secure.
Complexity. Suppose that e(g, h) can be pre-computed. In the setup stage,
the issuer needs to compute one exponentiation, and send one element in Zq
to the sender. The sender needs to compute one exponentiation. In the issue
phase, the issuer needs to compute one exponentiation, and send one element
in G1 and one element in Zp to the receiver. The receiver needs to compute
one exponentiation and one pairing. In the commitment phase, the sender
needs to compute 2n + 1 exponentiations, and send n elements in G2 and
n elements in Gτ to the receiver. In the transfer phase, The receiver needs
to computes k pairings and 2k exponentiations, and send k elements in Gτ
to the sender. The sender needs to compute k exponentiations, and sends k
elements in Gτ to the receiver. The costs of computation and communication
in our AC-OTnk×1 -I are listed in TABLE 1 and TABLE 2, respectively. By e
and p, we denote one exponentiation and one paring computing, respectively.
By E1 , Eτ and Eq , we denote one element in G1 , Gτ and Gq , respectively.
3

The short signature is existentially unforgeable against the weakly chosen message
attack under the -SDH assumption 38 .
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3.2. Oblivious Transfer with Access Control-II
Based on the signature 17 4 , and the oblivious transfer 40 , we propose an
oblivious transfer with access control AC-OTnk×1 -II, where only the authorized receivers can obtain services from the sender adaptively. The sender
knows the number of the services the receiver can obtain if he has been
authorized, but knows nothing about the contents of the selected services.
Additionally, the credential of the receiver is all-or-nothing non-transferable.
Namely, our scheme captures the following properties:
1. Zero knowledge proof is not required.
2. The receiver is not required to authenticate himself to the sender.
3. The sender knows the number of the services that can be obtained by
the authorized receiver, and nothing about the contents of the selected
services.
4. The receiver can not share his credentials with others.
AC-OTnk×1 -II is described in Fig 2.
Theorem 6. AC-OTnk×1-II is correct.
Proof. If the receiver R has obtained a credential (σ, s, r), he can compute
Aij = e(σ, Cij ,1 )
1

= e((g0 g1s g2xu ) x+r , (yhr )tij )
1

= e((g0 g1s g2xu ) x+r , hx+r )tij
= e(g0 g1s g2xu , h)tij
= e(g0 , h)tij e(g1 , h)stij e(g2 , h)xu tij ,
Aij
)s j
s
Cij ,2 Cixju,3
e(g0 , h)tij e(g1 , h)stij e(g2 , h)xu tij sj
(
)
e(g1 , h)stij e(g2 , h)xu tij
e(g0 , h)sj tij ,

Bij = (
=
=
4

This signature scheme was proposed by Boneh, Boyen and Shacham 41 , and modiﬁed
and proven secure by Au, Susilo, and Mu 17 .
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Setup. Taking as input a security parameter λ, this algorithm outputs a bilinear group (e, G1 , G2 , Gτ ) ← GG(1λ ) with prime order q, where e : G1 × G2 →
Gτ . Let g0 , g1, g2 , g3 be the generators of G1 , and h be the generator of G2 , respectively. The issuer I generates his private-public key pair (x, y) ← KG(1λ ),
R
where x ← Z∗q and y = hx . The receiver R generates his private-public key
R

pair (xu , yu ) ← KG(1λ ), where xu ← Z∗q and yu = g2xu . The sender S generates
R

his private-public key pair (z, Z) ← KG(1λ ), where z ← Z∗q and Z = e(g0 , h)z .
R

The issuer selects r ← Z∗q , and sends r to the sender a , where z ≡ x+r (mod q)
and x + r ≡ 0, 1 (mod q).
R

1

Issue. The issuer chooses s ← Z∗q , computes σ = (g0 g1s g2xu ) x+r , and sends
?

(σ, r, s) to the receiver R. R checks e(σ, yhr ) = e(g0 g1s g2xu , h).
Commitment Phase. Suppose that S has messages M1 , M2 , · · · , Mn ∈ Gτ . S
R
chooses t1 , t2 , · · · , tn ← Z∗q , and computes T = yhr and (Ci,1 , Ci,2, Ci,3 , Ci,4 ),
where Ci,1 = T ti , Ci,2 = e(g1 , h)ti , Ci,3 = e(g2 , h)ti , Ci,4 = e(g0 , h)zti · Mi , for
i = 1, 2, · · · , n. S sends {(Ci,1 , Ci,2, Ci,3 , Ci,4 )}ni=1 to R.
Transfer Phase.
R

1. R chooses sj ← Z∗q , and computes
Aij = e(σ, Cij ,1 ) = e(g0 , h)tij e(g1 , h)stij e(g2 , h)xu tij
Bij = (

Aij
sj tij
sj
xu ) = e(g0 , h)
s
Cij ,2 Cij ,3

where ij ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}.
Bij

2. R −−→ S.
Dij

3. R ←−− S. S computes Dij = (Bij )z , and sends Dij to R.
s−1

4. R computes Eij = Dijj and Mij =
a

Ci,4
.
Eij

r is the identiﬁer of the sender in the trusted circle.

Figure 2: Oblivious Transfer with Access Control-II (AC-OTnk×1 -II)
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s−1

zs−1

Eij = Dijj = Bij j = e(g0 , h)ztij ,
and
e(g0 , h)ztij · Mij
Cij ,4
=
Eij
e(g0 , h)ztij
= Mij .
Theorem 7. AC-OTnk×1-II is unconditionally receiver-secure.
Proof. For any Bij received by the sender from the receiver, there exists an
s
su ∈ Zq (u = j) such that Bij = Aijj = e(g, h)sj tij = e(g, h)sutiu = Asiuu = Biu ,
sj ti

namely su = ti j mod q.
u
Hence, from the view of the sender, Bij is computed from Cij ,1 or Ciu ,1 is
identically distributed. AC-OTnk×1 -II is unconditionally receiver-secure.
Theorem 8. AC-OTnk×1-II is sender-secure, if the XCT-CDH assumption
holds in Gτ .
Proof. For any probabilistic polynomial-time malicious R̂ in the real model,
we can construct an probabilistic polynomial-time malicious R̂∗ in the ideal
model such that the outputs of R̂ and R̂∗ are indistinguishable.
1. S sends M1 , M2 , · · · , Mn to the trusted third party Charlie.
R

2. R̂∗ sends C1∗ , C2∗ , · · · , Cn∗ to Charlie, where Ci∗ = (Ci∗1 , Ci∗2 , Ci∗3 , Ci∗4 ) ←
G2 × G3τ , for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
3. R̂∗ monitors the outputs of R̂. If R̂ can compute Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Aik and
Bi1 , Bi2 , · · · , Bik , R̂∗ chooses A∗i1 , A∗i2 , · · · , A∗ik and Bi∗1 , Bi∗2 , · · · , Bi∗k ,
R

where A∗iw , Bi∗w ← Gτ , for w = 1, 2, · · · , k.
4. When R̂ takes as input Bi1 , Bi2 , · · · , Bik to obtain Di1 , Di2 , · · · , Dik ,
R̂∗ queries the help oracle HGτ (·) on Bi∗1 , Bi∗2 , · · · , Bi∗k , and gets back
∗
with Di∗1 , Di∗2 , · · · , Di∗k , where Di∗w = Bizw , for w = 1, 2, · · · , k.
5. If R̂ can compute Eij = e(g0 , h)ztij , R̂∗ sends ij to Charlie. Charlie
returns

Ci∗ ,4
j

Mij

.
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6. R̂∗ outputs (A∗i1 , A∗i2 , · · · , A∗ik , Bi∗1 , Bi∗2 , · · · , Bi∗k , Di∗1 , Di∗2 , · · · , Di∗k , C1∗ ,
C2∗ , · · · , Cn∗ ).
If R̂ obtains k + 1 messages, R̂∗ does not know which k indices are really
selected by R̂. The simulation fails. Otherwise, we will show that R̂ can get
at most k messages under the XCT-CDH assumption. If R̂ can get k + 1
messages, he can compute Eij , for j = 1, 2, · · · , k +1. Namely, after receiving
(e(g0 , h)ti1 )z , (e(g0 , h)ti2 )z , · · · , (e(g0 , h)tik )z , R̂ can compute (e(g0 , h)tik+1 )z .
This contradicts to the XCT-CDH assumption. Hence, R̂ can obtain at most
k messages.
{Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Aik } and {Bi1 , Bi2 , · · · , Bik } are random elements in Gτ .
{C1 , C2 , · · · , Cn } are random elements in G2 × G3 . {Di1 , Di2 , · · · , Dik } and
{Di∗1 , Di∗2 , · · · , Di∗k } are identically distributed.
Therefore, the outputs of R̂ and R̂∗ are indistinguishable.
Theorem 9. AC-OTnk×1-II is semantically secure under the -SDH assumption and XCT-CDH assumption.
Proof. There are two types adversaries:
Type-I: The adversary can compute Âi = e(g, h)ti , then he can act as
the authorized receiver to interact with the sender.
Type-II: The adversary can compute the decryption key e(g, h)zti from
Ci .
We will show that Type-I adversary can be used to break the -SDH
assumption or XCT-CDH assumption and Type-II adversary can be used to
break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Type-I: Suppose that A is Type-I adversary.
1. If A can forge a signature (σ ∗ , r, s∗ ) on x∗u , then compute Ai , Bi , and Ei ,
there exists an algorithm B who can use A to break the -SDH
assumption 5 .
5

The signature is existentially unforgeable against the adaptively chosen messages attack under -SDH assumption 17 .
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2. If A can not compute (σ ∗ , r, s∗ ), he can compute Âi from Ci,1 , Ci,2 ,
Ci,3 . If it is, there exists an algorithm B can use A to break the
XCT-CDH assumption as follows: Given e(g, Ci,1) = (e(g, h)x+r )ti ,
e(g1 , h)ti , e(g2 , h)ti and e(g0 , h), the aim of B is to compute
e(g0 , h)ti . B sends Ci,1 , Ci,2, Ci,3 to A, if A can compute e(g0 , h)ti ,
B aborts. B can use A to break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Type-II: Suppose that A is Type-II adversary. If A can compute
e(g0 , h)zti from Ci,1 , Ci,2 , Ci,3, there exists an algorithm B can uses A
to break the XCT-CDH assumption as follows: Given e(g, Ci,1) =
(e(g, h)x+r )ti , e(g1 , h)ti , e(g2 , h)ti and Z = e(g0 , h)z , the aim of B is
to compute (e(g0 , h)z )ti . B sends Ci = (Ci,1 , Ci,2, Ci,3 , Ci,4) to A, if A
C
can compute Mi , B aborts. B can compute e(g0 , h)zti = Mi,4i . So, B can
use A to break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Therefore, AC-OTnk×1 -II is semantically secure.
Complexity. Suppose that e(g0 , h), e(g1 , h) and e(g2 , h) can be pre-computed.
In the setup stage, the issuer needs to compute one exponentiation, and send
one element in Zq to the sender. The receiver needs to compute one exponentiation. The sender needs to compute one exponentiation. In the issue
phase, the issuer needs to compute two exponentiations and send one element
in G1 and two elements in Zq to the receiver. The receiver needs to compute
two exponentiations and two parings. In the commitment phase, the sender
needs to compute 4n + 1 exponentiations, and send n elements in G2 and
3n elements in Gτ to the receiver. In the transfer phase, The receiver needs
to computes k pairings and 4k exponentiations, and send k elements in Gτ
to the sender. The sender needs to compute k exponentiations, and sends k
elements in Gτ to the receiver. The costs of computation and communication
in our AC-OTnk×1 -II are listed in TABLE 3 and TABLE 4, respectively.
4. Conclusion
One of the fundamental challenges in open communication channel is
to protect user’s privacy, including both PII and the selected services. In
this paper, we proposed two eﬃcient oblivious transfer with access control
schemes. In our schemes, the receiver can obtain services from the sender
19

adaptively if he has been authorized by the issuer. The sender knows the
number of the selected items, but nothing about the receiver’s choices and his
PII. The receiver is required to authenticate himself to the issuer to obtain a
credential, and is not required to prove that he is an authorized receiver to the
sender. Notably, there is no need of zero knowledge proof. The credentials in
the ﬁrst scheme are transferable, and all-or-nothing non-transferable in the
second one.
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Table 1: The computation cost in AC-OTnk×1 -I scheme
Schem
AC-OTnk×1 -I

Computation Cost
Setup
Issue
Commitment Phase
I R S I
R
S
R
e 0 e e e + 2p (2n + 1)e
0

Transfer Phase
S
R
ke
2ke + kp

Table 2: The communication cost in AC-OTnk×1 -I scheme
Scheme
AC-OTnk×1 -I

Setup
I→S
Eq

Communication Cost
Issue
Commitment Phase
I→R
I→S
S→R
R→S
E1 + Eq
0
nE2 + nEτ
0

Transfer Phase
S→R R→S
kEτ
kEτ

Table 3: The computation cost in our AC-OTnk×1 -II scheme
Scheme
AC-OTnk×1 -II

Setup
Issue
I R S I
R
e e e 2e 2e + 2p

Computation Cost
Commitment Phase
S
R
(4n + 1)e
0

Transfer Phase
S
R
ke
4ke + kp

Table 4: The communication cost in our AC-OTnk×1 -II scheme
Scheme
AC-OTnk×1 -I

Setup
I→S
Eq

Communication Cost
Issue
Commitment Phase
I→R
I→S
S→R
R→S
E1 + 2Eq
0
nE2 + 3nEτ
0
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Transfer Phase
S→R R→S
kEτ
kEτ

